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Abstract 
Security remains as a major concern in the mobile ad hoc 
networks. This paper presents a new protocol SD-AODV, which 
is an extension of the exiting protocol AODV. The proposed 
protocol is made secure and dynamic against three main types of 
routing attacks-  wormhole attack, byzantine attack and 
blackhole attack. SD-AODV protocol was evaluated through 
simulation experiments done on Glomosim and performance of 
the network was measured in terms of packet delivery fraction, 
average end-to-end delay, global throughput and route errors of a 
mobile ad hoc network where a defined percentage of nodes 
behave maliciously. Experimentally it was found that the 
performance of the network did not degrade in the presence of 
the above said attacks indicating that the proposed protocol was 
secure against these attacks. 
 
Keywords: Nework Security, Routing Attacks, Routing Protocol, 
Simulation Experiments.  
1. Introduction 
A multi-hop mobile ad hoc network (MANET) 
consists of a group of mobile wireless nodes that self 
configure to operate without infrastructure support. 
Network peers communicate beyond their individual 
transmission ranges by routing packets through 
intermediate nodes.  
 
Security remains as a concern in MANET. In general, a 
MANET is vulnerable due to its fundamental cooperation 
of open medium, absence of central authorities, dynamic 
topology, distributed cooperation and constrained 
capability [1].  A node in the MANET without any 
adequate protection can become an easy target for attacks.  
Attacker just needs to be within radio range of a node in 
order to intercept the network traffic.  
 
The attacks on MANET are classified as passive attacks 
and active attacks [22]. In passive attacks, an intruder 
snoops the data exchanged between the nodes without 
altering it. In these type of attacks, a selfish node abuses 
constrained resources such as battery power for its own 
benefit. The goal of an attacker is to obtain the 
information that is being transmitted that leads to the 
violation of massage confidentiality. Passive attacks are 
difficult to detect because the activity of the network is not 
disrupted in these attacks. 
 
In active attacks, an attacker actively participates in 
disrupting the normal operation of the network services. 
These can be performed by injecting incorrect routing 
information to poison the routing table or by creating a 
loop. These attacks are further divided into external and 
internal attacks. External attacks are carried by nodes that 
are not authorized part of the network. Internal attacks 
come from compromised nodes, which are legitimate part 
of the network. Active attacks are very difficult to detect 
because the attacker is part of the network.  
 
There are basically two approaches to securing a MANET: 
proactive and reactive. The proactive approach attempts to 
prevent security attack, typically through various 
cryptographic techniques. On the other hand, the reactive 
approach finds an attack and reacts accordingly. Both 
approaches has there own merits and suitable for different 
issues of security in MANET. Most of the secure routing 
protocols adopt proactive approach to securing routing 
control messages and reactive approach to secure data 
packet forwarding messages. A complete security solution 
requires both proactive and reactive approaches.   
 
While a number of routing protocols [3-11] have been 
proposed by the Internet Engineering Task Force’s 
MANET working group but they are silent in terms of 
security. Most of the MANET secure routing protocols 
have been proposed in the literature such as SEAD [12], 
ARIADNE [13], SAR [14], SRP [15], CONFIDANT [16], 
ENDAIRA [17],  TESLA [21] etc. do not mitigate against 
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these attacks. Some solutions against particular attacks 
have been presented by the researchers such as rushing 
attack and defenses [18], wormhole attack and defenses 
[19], sybil attack and    defenses [20]. Because these 
solutions are designed explicitly with certain attack 
models in mind so they work well in the presence of 
designated attacks but may collapse under unanticipated 
attacks. Therefore, a more ambitious goal for MANET 
security is to develop a multifence security solution that 
can offer multiple lines of defenses against both known 
and unknown security threats.  
 
Rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 
discusses the base routing protocol AODV. Section 3 
describes the new protocol SD-AODV. Section 4 
describes and compares the simulation experiment and 
result performed on AODV and SD-AODV protocol in 
presence of malicious nodes. Section 5 gives the 
concluding remarks. 
2.  Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector 
(AODV) Routing Protocol 
AODV is an improvement on DSDV [23] because it 
typically minimizes the number of required broadcasts by 
creating routes on a demand basis. AODV routing 
protocol uses reactive approach for finding routes, that is, 
a route is established only when it is required by any 
source node to transmit data packets. The protocol uses 
destination sequence numbers to identify the recent path. 
In this protocol, source node and the intermediate nodes 
store the next node information corresponding to each data 
packet transmission. In an on-demand routing protocol, 
the source node floods the Route REQuest (RREQ) packet 
in the network when a route is not available for the desired 
destination. It may obtain multiple routes to different 
destinations from a single RREQ. A node updates its path 
information only if the destination sequence number of the 
current packet received is greater than the last destination 
sequence number stored at the node. 
 
A RREQ carries the source identifier (SrcID), the 
destination identifier(DestID), the source sequence 
number (SrcSeqNum) and destination sequence number 
(DestSeqNum), the broadcast identifier (BcastID), and the 
time to live (TTL) field. DestSeqNum shows the freshness 
of the route that is selected by the source node. When an 
intermediate node receives a RREQ, it either forwards it or 
prepares a route reply (RREP) if it has a valid route to the 
destination. The validity of a route at the intermediate 
node is determined by comparing the sequence number at 
packet. If a RREQ is received multiple times, which is 
indicated by BcastID-SrcID pair, then the duplicate copies 
are discarded. All intermediate nodes having valid routes 
to the destination, or the destination node itself are 
allowed to send RREP packets to the source. Every 
intermediate node, while forwarding a RREQ, enters the 
previous node address and its BcastID. A timer is used to 
delete this entry in case a RREP is not received before the 
timer expires. This helps in storing an active path at the 
intermediate node as AODV does not employ source 
routing of the data packets. When a node receives a RREP 
packet, information about the previous node from which 
the packet was received is also stored in order to forward 
the data packet to this next node as the next hop towards 
the destination. 
3. Proposed SD-AODV Protocol 
The existing AODV protocol is not secure against 
any routing attack. We have extended the existing AODV 
protocol to make it secure against the three types of 
routing attacks- Wormhole attack, Byzantine attack and 
Blackhole attack. The proposed protocol is named SD-
AODV (Secure and Dynamic Ad Hoc On-Demand 
Distance Vector) which is secure and dynamic against In 
following paragraphs we describe different schemes to 
make the protocol secure against the above said three 
attacks. 
 
Let N= {n1, n2, n3,…….,nk} is a set of k nodes in the 
network that includes destination nodes and malicious 
node. Let D={d1,d2,d3,…….,dj} is a set j destination nodes 
where ND  , j<k and M={m1, m2, m3,………,mh}is set 
of h malicious nodes where NM  , h<k. Any member 
of M can act as a malicious node to perform either 
wormhole attack malicious node or byzantine malicious 
node or blackhole malicious node.  The three different 
schemes has been formed and tested to safeguard against 
three different attacks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Wormhole Attack  
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The first scheme makes the proposed protocol secure 
against the wormhole attack. In the wormhole attack, an 
attacker receives packets at one location in the network 
and tunnels them to another location in the network. The 
tunnel between these two locations is referred as a 
wormhole. Due to the broadcast nature of the radio 
channel, the attacker can create a wormhole even for 
packets not addressed to itself. In Figure 1, let us assume 
node A is source node, H is destination node and E is 
malicious node, which can commit wormhole attack. 
When node A broadcasts a RREQ packet to its neighbors 
B, C and E, then the malicious node E commit wormhole 
attack and changes its destination address to G hence the 
request does not reach to the destination node H. 
 
To safeguard against the wormhole attack we make use of 
hash chains in the proposed protocol. Hash chains are 
created by applying a secure hash algorithm [24]. This 
scheme is used for protecting the portion of the information 
in the RREQ messages, which is destination address. The 
protocol computes the digest (DigestAddr) of the 
destination address and appends that with the RREQ 
packet. It computes and compares the destination address at 
every intermediate node. If the destination address has been 
changed by the intermediate node, then it declares the node 
as malicious node and change the destination address to its 
original. Steps of the scheme are summarized below: 
 
The second scheme makes the proposed protocol secure 
against the byzantine attack. In the byzantine attack, a 
malicious node or a set of malicious node works in 
collusion and carries out attacks such as creating routing 
loops and routing packets on non-optimal paths. It 
consumes energy and bandwidth of the network. In Figure 
2, let us again assume node B is source node, H is 
destination node and C is malicious node, which can 
commit routing loop attack. When node B wants to 
transmit a data packet to the destination node H, the 
malicious node C loops the information back to node A as 
shown in Figure 2 and the packet does not reach to the 
destination node H. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Byzantine Attack  
 
SD-AODV protects the mutable information such as Next-
hop field in the RREQ. This assures that nodes receiving 
AODV messages that the Next-hop value provided are 
accurate and have not been changed by the malicious node 
on the path. Every time when a node route packet to MAC 
layer the protocol dynamically save the value of Next-hop 
field. Whenever any intermediate node receives an RREQ 
message, the protocol verifies the Next-hop values. If the 
Next-hop value has been changed, the node is declared as a 
malicious node. The protocol then changes the Next-hop 
value to its original. Steps of the scheme are summarized 
below: 
 
 
The third scheme makes the proposed protocol secure 
against the blackhole attack. In the blackhole attack, a 
malicious node falsely advertises good paths (e.g. shortest 
Step 1: Compute DigestAddr of destination address by 
 calling 
 SHAReset (…) function and 
 SHAInput (…) function 
Step 2: Append computed digest in DigestAddr of Data 
 packet. 
Step 3: if (nx is an Intermediate Node) then 
 Fetch Destination address from Data packet and 
compute digest  named New_computed_Digest 
by calling 
 Call SHAReset (…) function and 
 Call SHAInput (…)  function 
Step 4: Compare DigestAddr with new computed digest 
 in Step 3 
 if(DigestAddr=New_Computed_Digest) then 
o mz node is detected as malicious node 
o SD-AODV change destination address field 
to accurate destination address  
 
Next hop
    C 
Next hop A 
Change the 
next hop 
B
A
F
H
C
D
G
E
I
The data packet has 
been looped back by 
node C to A 
Step 1: Everytime when  RoutePacketAndSendToMac(…) 
 called 
 SD-AODV save the value of  Next-hop 
dynamically. 
 
Step 2: if (nx is an Intermediate Node and dy exist in route 
table) then 
 If (Address of Next-hop has been altered) then 
 mz node is detected as malicious node 
 SD-AODV changes its value to original by 
updating route table. 
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path or most established path) to destination node during 
the route request phase. The intention of malicious node 
could be to hinder the route request phase or to stop all 
data packets being sent to the actual destination node. In 
Figure 3, let us again assume node A is source node, D is 
destination node and G is malicious node, which can 
commit routing blackhole attack. When node A wants to 
transmit a route request packet to the destination node H, 
the malicious node E advertise itself as shortest path and 
sends route reply shown in Figure 3 and the packet does 
not reach to the destination node H. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure3. Blackhole  Attack  
SD-AODV dynamically protects the route establishment 
process, by cross verifying the RREP (Route reply) 
message to ensure that the sender will not receive any 
RREP from malicious node. Steps of the scheme are 
summarized below: 
 
 
4. Simulation Experiment and Results 
A simulation experiment was performed by using 
Glomosim [2] simulator to study the effects of all the three 
attacks mentioned above on the proposed protocol: SD-
AODV. The simulation experiment was performed on a 
computer with Intel core 2 Duo 1.7 GHz processor and 
2GB RAM. The simulation experiment was performed 
twice by taking 50 and 100 node to study the effects of the 
three attacks by measuring the performance of the 
network. In each of the case i.e. 50 nodes and 100 nodes 
simulation was carried out several times with different 
seed values.  Other parameters that were taken for 
simulation are shown in the table 1. 
Table 1: Simulation Parameter Value 
Parameter Vale  Description 
Terrain Range 1KM× 1KM X,Y Dimension in Kilometer 
Power Range 250m Nodes’s power range in 
meters 
Simulation 
Time 
100 s Simulation duration in 
seconds 
Node 
Placement  
Uniform Node placement policy 
Mobility  5m/s-20 m/s  Random Waypoint in meter 
per second 
Traffic Modal CBR Constant bit rate 
Packet Size 512 Bytes Minimum transfer unit 
MAC IEEE 
802.11 
Medium Access Control 
Protocol 
Bandwidth 2MBPS Node’s Bandwidth in Mega 
bits per second 
Routing 
Protocol 
AODV Base routing protocol  for ad 
hoc networks 
 
The same experiment was repeated for the existing 
protocol AODV in order the compare it with the proposed 
protocol SD-AODV. 
 
4.1 Testing SD-AODV and AODV Protocols against 
Wormhole, Byzantine and Blackhole attacks 
The performance of the network was evaluated by using 
the following four metrics (i) Packet Delivery Fraction 
(PDF), (ii) Average End-to-End Delay, (iii) Throughput 
and (iv) Route error. 
 
Packet Delivery Fraction (PDF): It is a ratio of the data 
packets delivered to the destinations to those generated by 
the Constant Bit Rate (CBR) sources. 
 
Average End-to-End Delay: This includes all possible 
delays caused by buffering during route discovery latency, 
queuing at the interface queue, retransmission delays at 
the MAC, and propagation and transfer times. 
 
Throughput: It is equal to the average performance of all 
nodes during simulation. It is a calculation of bits per 
second processed by each node. 
 
Route Errors:The error messages garneted by the protocol 
during simulation. 
 
RREP 
RREQ 
RREQ 
A
B
C D
EG
H
The node G advertises itself as 
shortest path and sends route reply 
Step 1:  if (nx is a Intermediate Node) then  
 Call RoutingAodvCheckRouteExist(…)  
 if (dy does not exists in Route Cache) 
then  
 mz node is detected as malicious node 
Step 2: SD-AODV stop the route establishment 
process by calling 
 RoutingAodvInitiateRREPbyIN (…)  
 RoutingAodvRelayRREQ(…..) 
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Simulation was performed by taking different seed values. 
In the experiment, the numbers of malicious node were 
increased starting from 5% to maximum of 30 % in the 
step of 5%. The Glomosim simulator generated a 
GLOMO.STAT file which contained all the statistics 
regarding number of packets send, number of packets 
received, number of bytes sents, number of bytes received,  
throughput(bits per second), delay (in seconds), number of 
route errors etc.  
4.1.1 Using Packet Delivery Fraction (PDF) 
PDF was calculated by extracting data from the 
GLOMO.STAT file and four curves (one for wormhole 
attack on AODV, one for byzantine attack on AODV and 
one for blackhole attack on AODV and one for three 
attack on SD-AODV) are plotted by taking %age of 
malicious node on X-axis and %age of PDF on Y-axis as 
shown in Figure 4(a) and 4(b) for 50 nodes and 100 nodes 
respectively. From the Figure 4(a) and (b), it is quite clear 
that SD-AODV not only prevents from various attacks but 
also gives better performance while increasing the number 
of malicious nodes.  
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Wormhole Attack on AODV
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e 
P
D
F
 Figure 4(a). PDF Comparison of different attacks on AODV and  
SD-AODV in 50 nodes scenario 
 
4.1.2 Average End-to-End Delay 
 
Average end-to-end delay was calculated by extracting 
data from the GLOMO.STAT file and four curves (one for 
wormhole attack on AODV, one for byzantine attack on 
AODV and one for blackhole attack on AODV and one 
for three attack on SD-AODV) are plotted by taking %age 
of malicious node on X-axis and Average delay on Y-axis 
as shown in Figure 5(a) and 5( b) for 50 nodes and 100 
nodes respectively. The average delay has been increased 
almost double in case of 100 nodes as compared to 50 
nodes. From the Figure 5(a) and 5(b), it is quite clear that 
the average delay has increased in the case of SD-AODV 
due to overhead increased for protection against three 
attacks. But it is still less as compare to Byzantine attack 
on AODV because it loops back data and utilize resources 
and bandwidth 
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Figure 4(b). PDF Comparison of different attacks on AODV and 
 SD-AODV in 100 nodes scenario 
 
%age Malicious Node
A
ve
ra
ge
 d
el
ay
(s
ec
.)
5 10 15 20 25 30
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
Wormhole Attack on AODV
Byzantine Attack on AODV
Blackhole Attack on AODV
SD-AODV 
 Figure 5(a). Average End-to-End Delay Comparison of different attacks 
on AODV and SD-AODV in 50 nodes scenario 
 
 
4.1.3 Throughput 
 
Throughput was calculated by extracting data from the 
GLOMO.STAT file and Four curves (one for wormhole 
attack on AODV, one for byzantine attack on AODV and 
one for blackhole attack on AODV and one for three 
attack on SD-AODV) are plotted by taking %age of 
malicious node on X-axis and throughput (bits per 
second) on Y-axis as shown in Figure 6(a) and 6(b) for 
50 nodes and 100 nodes respectively. It is obvious from 
the figures that, throughput is increased in case of SD-
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AODV due to more calculation work for protective 
measures. 
%age Malicious Node
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 Figure 5(b). Average End-to-End Delay Comparison of different attacks 
on AODV and SD-AODV in 100 nodes scenario 
Th
ro
ug
hp
ut
 (b
its
 p
er
 s
ec
on
d)
%age Malicious Node
5 10 15 20 25 30
3400
3600
3800
4000
4200
4400
Wormhole Attack on AODV
Byzantine Attack on AODV
Blackhole Attack on AODV
SD-AODV 
 
Figure 6(a). Throughput Comparison of different attacks on AODV and 
SD-AODV in 50 nodes scenario 
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 Figure 6(b). Throughput Comparison of different attacks on AODV and 
SD-AODV in 100 nodes scenario 
 
 
 
 
4.1.4 Route Errors 
 
Number of route errors was calculated by extracting data 
from the GLOMO.STAT file and Four curves (one for 
wormhole attack on AODV, one for byzantine attack on 
AODV and one for blackhole attack on AODV and one 
for three attack on SD-AODV) are plotted by taking %age 
of malicious node on X-axis and number of route errors on 
Y-axis as shown in Figure 6(a) and 6(b) for 50 nodes and 
100 nodes respectively. It is quite clear that number of 
route errors have drastically increased in the case of 
blackhole attack because it attacks on route establishment 
process. Route errors are nominal in case of SD-AODV. 
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 Figure 7(a). No. of Route Error Comparison of different attacks on 
AODV and SD-AODV in 50 nodes scenario 
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Figure 7(b). No. of Route Error Comparison of different attacks on 
AODV and SD-AODV in 100 nodes scenario 
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4. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have presented a protocol which is secure 
& dynamic against three types of attacks - wormhole 
attack, Byzantine attack and blackhole attack. The 
protocol is based on the existing protocol AODV. The 
proposed protocol has been tested on Glomosim by using 
four metrics- packet delivery Fraction, average end-to-end 
delay of data packets, throughput and route error against 
widely used protocol AODV. 
 
The packet delivery fraction (PDF) metric has shown that 
all the three routing attacks sharply decrease the PDF 
performance in the case of AODV protocol but in case of 
the proposed protocol SD-AODV there is no fall in the 
PDF, which has clearly indicated that the proposed 
protocol has became secure against the three attacks in 
question.  
 
The Average end-to-end delay metric has shown that 
average delay has increased in the case of proposed 
protocol when the node has got the blackhole attack and 
wormhole attack, but it is lesser in case of Byzantine 
attack. The straight increase in delay can be attributed to 
the overhead incurred due the implementation of 
additional functionality of the SD-AODV protocol.  
 
The result of throughput metric has shown that it is higher 
in case of the SD-AODV protocol as comparison to 
AODV protocol in the presence of the three attacks. This 
again indicates that the proposed protocol has become 
secure against these attacks.  
 
The route errors have drastically decreased in case of SD-
AODV protocol, but the results have also shown that the 
route errors are slightly more in case of SD-AODV as 
compared to AODV protocol when wormhole attack takes 
place because in wormhole attack the destination address 
is changed cleanly without affecting the route. 
 
In nutshell, we can say that the proposed SD-AODV 
protocol has become secure and dynamic against these 
three attacks. 
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